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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN), in its life of forty-eight years, has faced several challenges1
as promoter of human rights in international arena. One such challenge has been to
ensure that even non-state actors such as transnational corporations (TNCs)2 respect
human rights, at least within their respective spheres of activity. The UN, in a way,
was alive to this when it constituted a Commission on Transnational Corporations in
mid-70s.3 Though the vision of the Commission to draft an agreeable code for TNCs
failed to materialise due to various reasons,4 the UN continued to pursue the issue of
social responsibility of TNCs in different forms and forums.5 The approval of the
Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms/Norms) by the Sub-
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1
The challenges related not only to ascertaining the ‘content’ of human rights but also to their effective
‘enforcement’.
2
The UN has preferred the usage of the term TNCs to multinational corporations (MNCs),
multinational enterprises (MNEs) or supranational entities. See generally CYNTHIA D. WALLACE,
LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 10-12 (1982). For the sake of conformity and
consistency, I have used TNCs in the same sense as defined by the Norms, and it denotes all the above
variations of corporate entities.
3
E.S.C. RES. 1913, U.N. ESCOR, 57TH Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. E/5570/ADD. 1 (1975).
4
See PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 593-96 (1995).
5
Since 1993 the issues related with TNCs are dealt with by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD). The issue of TNCs’ social responsibility, including the obligation to
observe human rights norms, is squarely dealt with in at least two of the papers issued by the
UNCATD, i. e., Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poiteiitm21.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003); and Social
Responsibility (2001), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//pstieiitd22.en.pdf (last visited Oct.
15, 2003). Presently, the Sub-Commission of Human Rights deals with TNCs and the interactions of
trade and human rights, which in turn has constituted a working group on TNCs.
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Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights6 in August 2003
represents a new vigour on the part of the UN in regulating corporate human rights
abuses. This development, together with the launch of Global Compact,7 clearly
reflects the necessity as well as urgency on part of the UN to revive its relevance8 in a
new world order in which states no longer enjoy the monopoly as violators of human
rights.9

6

Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th Session, Agenda Item 4,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 of 26 August 2003, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/64155e7e8141b38cc1256d63002c55e8?Ope
ndocument (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter UN Norms].
7
The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact, consisting of nine principles in
the areas of human rights, labour and environment, on 31 January 1999 at the World Economic Forum
in Davos. The Compact calls upon business enterprises to embrace, support, and enact a set of core
values in the above three areas. See Alexis M. Taylor, The UN and the Global Compact, 17 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 975, 978-79 (2001).
8
The Secretary General Kofi Annan said: “I see the Compact as a chance for the UN to renew itself
from within, and to gain greater relevance in the twenty-first century by showing that it can work with
non-state actors, as well as states, to achieve the broad goals on which its members have agreed.”
Global Compact: Report on Progress and Activities (Draft), 3, available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/global_compact/ProgressReport%20July%203.pdf (last visited Sept. 15,
2003) [hereinafter Compact Progress Report]. Being alive to changing needs, the General Assembly of
the UN has now passed a resolution, Towards Global Partnerships, G.A. Res. 55/215, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., U.N. Doc A/55/228 (2000), authorizing continued engagement of the UN with the private
sector, including the Global Compact initiative.
9
This is clear from two facts. First, since early 90s there is a spur in cases filed against TNCs for
human rights abuses all over the world generally and in the US in particular under the Alien Tort
Claims Act. See for a discussion of some of these human rights violating corporate activities, Beth
Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 45, 51-53 (2002); Aaron X. Fellmeth, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: A New Standard
for the Enforcement of International Law in the U.S. Courts?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 241,
244-45 (2002); Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can they be Held Liable
under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 927, 958-64
(1998); John C. Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 464-65 (2000); Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It and Why the United States
Shouldn’t: The United States’ International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor
- 11 (1999); Anita Ramasastry, Corporate
Rights Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 395, 400
Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon – An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact
on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 131-36 (2002); Mahmood
Monshipouri, Claude E. Welch, Jr. & Evan T. Kennedy, Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of
Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 965, 973-77
(2003). Second, of the largest 100 economies in the world, 51 are TNCs and only 49 are states. Nicola
Jagers, The Legal Status of the Multinational Corporation under International Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 260 (Michael K. Addo ed.,
1999). The 2003 survey shows that there are now 72 TNCs in the list of 100 largest economic entities.
Paul Sheehan, A Rising Force in Capital and Culture, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, January 3-4, 2004,
at 21. See also Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/top200.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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The UN Norms, however, have not received the attention of academia they deserved;
the release/approval of the Norms is not followed by the searching academic
critiques.10 Though the Norms undoubtedly represent an improvement in terms of
both formulation and implementation of human rights standards over earlier such
attempts at the international level, they still fall short of what is required for evolving
an effective international regulatory regime of corporate human rights responsibility.
In this article I intend to analyse the provisions as well as omissions of the UN
Norms. The central objective of the analysis is to highlight the operational
shortcomings, and also explore the possible approaches that could be taken to remedy
them before the Norms come up for consideration and further action before the UN
Commission on Human Rights in March 2004. By way of caveat, it should be noted
that I do not make any claim of offering final and/or detailed solutions to such
shortcomings; the primary idea being to put an academic debate into motion.

I begin in Part II by briefly explaining how the Norms make a departure from the
past, and could be characterised, in view of such departure, as an improvement over
their predecessor as well as other current regulatory regimes of corporate human
rights responsibility. Part III first reviews the human rights obligations of TNCs as
laid down in the Norms, and then highlights the two operational difficulties that they
might face: the one of which is the result of (over)-reference to international human
rights instruments whereas the other relate to putting universal standards of human
rights into practice. Regarding the first issue, I will argue it is desirable that the
human rights obligations of TNCs are enumerated, as far as possible and in an
inclusive manner, in a schedule to the Norms. As far as the second difficulty is
10

My search on Lexis and Westlaw did not yield even a single entry which addressed these Norms. On
search through Google, I could, however, found an article by Carolin Hillemanns published in a web-
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concerned, despite a claim for universality of human rights and the common standards
flowing from such universality, it is necessary for the UN Norms to acknowledge a
distinction between, what I term, “aspirational” and “operational” standards of human
rights. The former signifies general objectives whereas the latter translates those
objectives into concrete measurable units. The Norms could possibly lay down only
the aspirational standards, the exact contours of which are to be determined by
making further rules at municipal levels.

The provisions of the Norms related to implementation of TNCs’ human rights
obligations are dealt with in Part IV. Though the Norms make a promising start by
employing multiple monitoring techniques both at national and international levels,
they neither invoke multiple sanctions to enforce obligations against TNCs nor go far
enough in establishing a vigorous enforcement mechanism. Moreover, it is equally
vital that the Norms also devote some attention to the procedural issues associated
with implementation of human rights standards. It is fundamental to the success of the
UN Norms that, at least, the rules regarding the application of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens and the liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations by
its subsidiaries are reexamined and agreed upon. Part V sums up the analysis,
including the arguments, and also throw some light on the future treatment of the
Norms.

II.

NATURE OF UN NORMS: DEPARTURE FROM THE
‘PAST’?

The starting point for an analysis of the provisions and omissions of the UN Norms
should, in my view, be the relevance of their place in an international mechanism of
based journal. Infra note 15.
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TNCs’ accountability for human rights violations. After all, what was the need for
these new (TNCs would also claim ‘additional’)11 norms when various international
initiatives already exist?12 The answer to this question must be found with reference
to the provisions of the Norms as compared with the provisions of their predecessor13
and other current regulatory regimes of corporate responsibility.14

The relevance of the UN Norms lies in the fact that they represent a shift in the
paradigms “that have to date dominated the discourse of corporate social
responsibility”15 and have been responsible for ineffective regulation of corporate
conduct impinging upon human rights.16 I argue that the Norms present the most

11

See, for example, the response of the United States Council for International Business (USCIB),
Talking Points on the Draft “Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”, available at http://209.238.219.111/USCIB-textTalking-Points.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003). USCIB is also critical of the Norms on the ground that,
among others, they (i) blur the line between voluntary and legal actions; (ii) are “predicted on the belief
that human rights can best be advanced by circumventing national political and legal frameworks”; (iii)
extend far beyond issues of “basic” human rights; (iv) impose impractical obligations. Compare Sir
Geoffrey Chandler, Commentary on the United States Council for International Business ‘Talking
Points’ on the Draft Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, who considers USCIB’s response to be “misleading and
factually inaccurate”, available at http://209.238.219.111/Chandler-commentary-on-USCIB-TalkingPoints.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
12
See, for example, the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy (1977) reprinted in 17 ILM 422 (1978), the revised version of 2000 is
reprinted in 41 ILM 186 (2002) [hereinafter Tripartite Declaration]; the OECD Declaration and
Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in 15 ILM 967 (1976),
the
revised
version
of
2000
is
available
at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/c5ce8ffa41835d64c125685d005300b0/c125692700623b74c
1256991003b5147/$FILE/00085743.PDF (last visited Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines];
and the Global Compact (1999). Besides, regulatory regimes/initiatives also exist at national and
regional levels. See, for example, the Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 (US); and the EU’S GREEN PAPER ON
PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2001), available at
http://www.ibeurope.com/Database/Factsheets/F051csr.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2003).
13
A reference could be made to the final draft of the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations proposed in 1990 by the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations.
Draft of the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN ESCOR, Doc. E/1990/94
(1990). The Code never came into force. See generally KWAMENA ACQUAAH, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE NEW REALITY 108-20 (1986); MUCHLINSKI,
supra note 4, at 592-97.
14
Supra note 12.
15
Carolin Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 4 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1065, at 1068 (2003),
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
16
See generally Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and
International Law: Where from Here?, 19 CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-57
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promising human rights norms for TNCs to date because of at least six factors. First,
instead of being limited to labour and/or environmental rights,17 the UN Norms
attempt to draw a comprehensive list of human rights obligations. Besides a general
obligation “to respect, ensure respect for, prevent abuse of, and promote human rights
recognized in international as well as national law”,18 the specific obligations relate to
the right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment; the right to security
of person; the right of workers; the respect for national sovereignty and human rights;
and the obligations with regard to consumer and environmental protection. The
general obligation to respect “international human rights” becomes a potent provision
in view of another provision in paragraph 23 which provides that a reference to
“international human rights” in the UN Norms includes all civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights.

Second, the Preamble to the Norms makes a clear, specific and unequivocal reference
to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other
international treaties to deduce obligations for TNCs.19 This provides a stronger and
more widely accepted basis of human rights responsibility generally, and a jus cogens
basis regarding some human rights.20 In view of the UN Norms’ reliance on the said
international covenants, one commentator has concluded that the Norms “thus
(2003) [hereinafter Deva, Human Rights Violations by MNCs]. I have argued, in brief, that the existing
international framework of corporate accountability “does not prescribe clear human rights standards,
is based upon flawed premises, relies excessively on states to enforce obligations and offers no
sanctions in case of non-compliance. In sum, the four-fold inadequacy of the system makes it
ineffective.” Id., 56.
17
Though the Tripartite Declaration makes a reference that the multinational enterprises “should
respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding International Covenants
adopted by the General Assembly” (supra note 12, para 8), the thrust of its provisions is undoubtedly
on labour and employment rights. Same could be said about the OECD Guidelines, despite the fact that
after the 2000 review a recommendation on human rights finds a place in para II.2. Supra note 12.
18
Supra note 6, para 1.
19
The reference to various international conventions, for the purpose of reliance, is quite elaborate and
covers a wide range of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. Id., the Preamble.

6

represent a restatement of existing international human rights law” which “already
does or should apply to companies’ conduct”.21 Though an academic argument could
be made that the UDHR or other international covenants apply to non-state actors
including TNCs,22 one should not, however, lose sight of the fact that those
international covenants were never drafted to directly23 apply to TNCs and therefore,
nowhere provided for any enforcement mechanism in case TNCs fail to observe the
obligations.24 Further, the very fact that there is a move towards framing human rights
norms “specifically” directed to TNCs also makes it clear there exist certain gaps in
the prevailing state-focal international regulatory regime.25 The UN Norms, therefore,
does more than merely stating the existing; they not only formulate obligations
directed clearly and directly to TNCs but also lay down the provisions for their
implementation.

Third, in terms of the nature of obligations also, the Norms clearly make an
encouraging advancement vis-à-vis the prior or existing corresponding instruments.

20

See generally B. Simma & P. Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and
General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1992).
21
Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1070.
22
Henkin argues with reference to the application of UDHR to corporations: “Every individual
includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company,
no market, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to them all.” Louis Henkin, The
Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 25
(1999). See also ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 91-101 (1993) (argues
that the European Convention of Human Rights and certain UN Conventions cover the protection of
human rights against the actions of private bodies and individuals).
23
Though it can be argued that the courts have ‘indirectly’ tried to make private actors accountable,
i.e., failure of state to prevent human rights violations by private persons, including corporations,
within its territory amounts to violation of a state’s mandate under the international conventions. See,
e.g., Guerra v Italy, 26 E.H.R.R. 357 (1998). See also David Kinley, Human Rights as Legally Binding
or Merely Relevant?, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25, 40-41 (Stephen Bottomley &
David Kinley eds., 2002); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 470 (2001).
24
An ICHRP report concludes that only the ILO and OECD enforcement mechanism were designed
with companies in mind. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND
VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF
COMPANIES 117 (2002) [hereinafter ICHRP, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM].
25
Ratner argues that “a system in which state is the sole target of international legal obligations may
not be sufficient to protect human rights.” Ratner, supra note 23, at 461.
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As TNCs could violate human rights in several ways (including by failing to act),26 it
is insufficient to draft obligations in conventional “negative” terms, i.e., that TNCs
should/shall not violate human rights. The UN Norms try to overcome this problem
by imposing “positive” obligations on TNCs.27 TNCs shall not only refrain from
directly or indirectly contributing to, and benefiting from, human rights violations but
also “use their influence in order to promote and ensure respect for human rights.”28

Fourth, the Norms substitute the conventional approach of “should” with “shall” in
terms of the compliance of the obligation.29 Although it may be suggested that the
change of terminology may not make much difference in terms of the end result and
that strictly speaking the Norms are still not binding, it is still a positive and definite
shift in approach, and should make a difference when coupled with provisions for
implementation of the norms.30 This shift is also a tacit acceptance of the fact that the

26

Deva, Human Rights Violations by MNCs, supra note 16, at 8. See also Lu, below n 138, 605-06;
Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 348-49 (2001) (examining silent complicity as the basis of
liability).
27
This is clear from the use of terms obligation to “promote” and “protect” human rights in para 1. See
also para 12 where an obligation is constructed in terms of not only respecting but also contributing to
the realization of human rights. Supra note 6. See, for an argument why TNCs should be under positive
obligations, Surya Deva, Human Rights Standards and Multinational Corporations: Dilemma Between
“Home” and “Rome”, 7 MEDITERRANEAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 69, 87-89 (2003) [hereinafter
Deva, Dilemma between “Home” and “Rome”].
28
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th Session, Agenda Item 4,
Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/293378ff2003ceb0c1256d7900310d90?Ope
ndocument (last visited Oct. 27, 2003), Commentary (b) to para 1 [hereinafter Commentary on UN
Norms]. See also Hillemanns, supra note 15, 1073.
29
A shift in approach is visible from the use of the term “shall” in paras 2-16, 17 and 19 as well as by
the fact that the provisions for implementation are given due importance and place in the UN Norms.
Supra note 6. See also Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1068.
30
It is important to note that para 14 of the final draft of the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational
``Corporations has chosen “shall” in place of “should.” It reads: “Transnational corporations shall
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which they operate.” (Emphasis
added). Supra note 13.
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prevailing “dialogue-cooperation” based approach of voluntary compliance31 with
human rights norms is not proving to be adequate.32

Fifth, the UN Norms propose specific provisions for implementation of human rights
norms.33 In fact, this is a corollary to the Norms opting for an obligatory approach to
the compliancy of the obligations. Besides asking states to “establish and reinforce the
necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring that the Norms … are
implemented by transnational corporations”,34 the Norms propose independent and
transparent periodic monitoring as well as verification by national and international
(including the UN) mechanisms.35 This again is a departure from the existing indirect
mode of implementation in which the responsibility of enforcement lies solely and
exclusively with states. A note must be taken of another significant provision of the
UN Norms which provides for prompt, adequate and effective reparation to persons
and communities adversely affected by failure to comply with responsibilities.36

Sixth, the scope of the Norms is not limited just to TNCs, but also covers “other
business enterprises,”37 that is, any business entity, regardless of its legal form and/or
area of operation, including a partnership, contractor, subcontractor, supplier, licensee
or distributor (hereinafter contractors-suppliers et al).38 The Norms shall apply to such
“other business enterprises” if they have any relation with a TNC, the impact of its
31

See, e.g., the Compact Progress Report, supra note 8, at 4. “It [the Global Compact] is a cooperative
framework based on internationally established rights and principles.” It must also be noted that
engaging in “policy dialogues” with the business sector is one of the four main areas of activity of the
Compact. Id. See also the OECD Guidelines, supra note 12, para I.1.
32
See Monshipouri et al, supra note 9, at 979-82. See also generally Macek, infra note 84.
33
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 15-19.
34
Id., para 17.
35
Id., para 16.
36
Id., para. 18. Compensation not as charity but for violation of a right due to omission of duty is
crucial. See infra note 130.
37
UN Norms, supra note 6, para. 1.
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activities is not entirely local, or the activities involve violations of the right to
security outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4.39 Such a wide amplitude of the UN Norms
should be seen as a response to the problem associated in pinning the precise
responsibility of a TNC. As in many situations the apparent violator is not a TNC but
its subsidiaries, contractors or suppliers, should the concerned TNC be allowed to
bypass the liability on technical grounds, e.g., the separation of personality or lack of
control? The Norms, thus, try to overcome this problem by directly and squarely
placing an obligation, that the contractors-suppliers et al40 of a TNC respect human
rights, on the concerned TNC.41 It must be noted that the obligation of TNCs also
extends to ensuring that their contractors- suppliers et al actually implement the Norms
in their respective operations.42 The Norms, therefore, send a clear message to TNCs:
either ensure that the entities with whom you do business dealings respect human
rights or do not deal with them, for failure to act may attract liability.43

The above analysis makes it manifest that the UN Norms represent a progress (and
that too in the right direction) over the prevailing regulatory regimes. At the same
time, one should not become unduly optimistic from this progress. Despite the above

38

Id., para. 21.
Id.
40
Though the definition of TNC in para 20 is wide enough to cover even the subsidiaries of a TNC,
“subsidiaries” as such are not specifically mentioned along with suppliers-contractors et al in para 21.
It seems, however, that the subsidiaries of a TNC could still be covered, being a “business enterprise”
having a “relation with a transnational corporation”. This interpretation could also be supported from
the language used in para 15. Supra note 6.
41
Para 1 provides: “… Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational
corporations and other business enterprises shall have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment
of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national
law, … ” (Emphasis added.) Supra note 6. See also Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1072-73.
42
This is clear from a provision regarding implementation found in para 15, which lays down: “…
Each transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and incorporate these Norms in
their contracts or other arrangements and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers,
licensees, distributors, or natural or other legal persons that enter into any agreement with the
transnational corporation or business enterprise in order to ensure respect for and implementation of
the Norms.” (Emphasis added.) Supra note 6.
43
See Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (c) to para 15.
39
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vital improvements, as compared with previous instruments, the Norms still suffer
from serious theoretical and operational shortcomings, both in terms of formulation
and implementation of human rights obligations. These shortcomings, together with
the positives, are dealt with below in the next two parts.

III.

FORMULATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS

In this section I first intend to briefly analyse the general as well as specific human
rights obligations of TNCs formulated under the UN Norms, and then examine some
of the operational difficulties which they might face. I also explore the possible
theoretical recourse that could help in overcoming those difficulties. But before
proceeding further, two clarifications. First, I have invoked, wherever considered
appropriate, the Commentary on UN Norms to understand and state human rights
obligations of TNCs because the Norms itself consider the Commentary to be “a
useful interpretation and elaboration of the standards contained” therein.44 Second, as
mentioned before, though the Norms are directed towards TNCs and other business
enterprises, for the sake of convenience I have used TNCs to indicate both.

A. Human Rights Obligations
1. General Obligations
The UN Norms begin by laying down general obligations in paragraph 1. The
obligations are two-fold: primary45 responsibility of states and “within their respective
spheres of activity and influence” the obligation of TNCs to “promote, secure the

44

UN Norms, supra note 6, the Preamble, 9th para.
Qualifying states’ responsibility by ‘primary’ may, though inadvertently, suggest that the
responsibility of TNCs is secondary. Such an implication is avoidable because in view of TNCs
emerging status, role and place, their responsibility to respect/promote human rights should also be
primary in nature. “Because MNCs have gained powers traditionally vested only in states, they should
arguably be held to the same standards that international law presently imposes upon states.”
Monshipouri et al, supra note 9, at 966.

45

11

fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights.”46 The general
obligations assume more significance because of two reasons. First, all the Norms that
follow are to be interpreted in the light of these general obligations.47 This
interpretational guideline becomes very potent in view of a broader spectrum of duties
conceived herein,48 and should go a long way in a (required) liberal construction of
the human rights obligations. Second, the appended commentary clarifies that the
obligations apply to corporations and other business enterprises irrespective of the
fact where they operate49 – whether in home or at ‘Rome’, that is, the host country.50
This again tries to address, at least at theoretical level, an issue which should have
been the starting point of any theory of corporate responsibility.

A difficulty may, however, arise in construing what is the “respective spheres of
activity and influence” of TNCs, especially when the Norms do not prescribe any
guidelines. For example, would it include the entire supply chain, and all the
subsidiaries as well as affiliate sister concerns of a TNC? Moreover, whether the
spheres of activity of a TNC engaged in, say, construction work would extend to
promoting right to education or privacy generally, i.e., outside its activity boundary?
As TNCs and human rights activists are likely to plead for opposing interpretations,
this aspect requires clarification.

46

UN Norms, supra note 6, para 1.
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (a) to para 1.
48
See supra notes 27 and 28.
49
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (a) to para 1.
50
Which standards of human rights corporations operating in many countries should follow has been a
critical issue of corporate responsibility debate. See Clare Duffield, Multinational Corporations and
Workers’ Rights, in Stuart Rees & Shelley Wright (eds.), HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY – A DIALOGUE 193 (2000); JOHN R BOATRIGHT, ETHICS AND THE CONDUCT OF
BUSINESS 379 (3rd edn., 2000). See also Deva, Dilemma between “Home” and “Rome”, supra note
27.
47
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2. Right to Equal Opportunity and Non-Discriminatory Treatment
The UN Norms mandates TNCs to “ensure equality of opportunity and treatment” in
order to eliminate discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political opinion, national or social origin, social status, indigenous status, disability
or age.51 Besides, there is also a diluted52 obligation to eliminate discrimination on the
ground of health status (including HIV/AIDS), marital status, capacity to bear
children, pregnancy and sexual orientation.53 The measures that accord special
protection to children, or are “designed to overcome past discrimination against
certain groups” are, however, considered not a negation but promotion of equality.54
TNCs are expected to pay special attention “to the consequences of business activities
that may affect the rights of women”, especially regarding conditions of work.55

Though the list of discriminating factors is appreciably extensive, it is difficult to
understand why the obligation is made soft regarding some equally important
variables. For example, despite HIV/AIDS and pregnancy being very potential
reasons for discrimination practiced by corporations all over the world,56 the Norms
prescribe no mandatory obligation to desist from such practices. In one respect
however, the Norms deserve credit: an express provision for taking affirmative action
measures to rectify past discrimination. Such a provision becomes crucial at a time
51

UN Norms, supra note 6, para 2.
‘Diluted’ because the obligation is drafted in terms of ‘should’ and moreover, laid down under the
commentary as distinguished from the main text of the relevant paragraph.
53
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (a) to para 2.
54
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 2.
55
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (c) to para 2.
56
A recent survey of about 8,000 high-level executives from firms in 103 countries reveals that “fewer
than 6 per cent of businesses surveyed have an HIV/AIDS-specific written policy that has received
formal approval”. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM – GLOBAL HEALTH INITIATIVE, BUSINESS AND HIV/AIDS:
ME?
(2003),
available
at
WHO
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Initiatives/GHI_BusinessAIDSWhoMe_WAD.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2003). See also generally INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, TIME FOR EQUALITY AT WORK
(2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/publ/reports/report4.htm (last
52
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when a fear is expressed that the assumption of public services by corporations, in
view of states resorting to privatisation and disinvestments, will not be accompanied
by adoption of erstwhile states’ policies of affirmative actions.57 But it should be
noted that the UN Norms do not make it clear whether this is merely an enabling
provision, or an obligation requiring taking of positive steps.58 In the context of
corporations, a provision for affirmative action would prove more effective only if it
is of the latter category.

3. Right to Security of Person
Paragraph 3 of the UN Norms deals with crimes against the human beings in violation
of international human rights and humanitarian law. TNCs, for example, shall neither
engage nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture,
forced disappearance, forced or compulsory labour, hostage-taking, and extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions.59 In addition, the appended commentary provides
that besides not producing or selling weapons declared illegal under international law,
TNCs which produce and/or supply military, security, or police products/services
shall also “take stringent measures to prevent those products and services from being
used to commit human rights or humanitarian law violations.”60 These provisions are
a reflection of the lessons learnt from the trial of several corporations for their direct

visited Dec. 18, 2003); Jayanth K Krishnan, The Rights of the New Untouchables: A Constitutional
Analysis of HIV Jurisprudence in India, 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 791-819 (2003).
57
For example, in the context of India, where Articles 15(4) and 16(4)/(4-A)/(4-B) of the Constitution
provide for special affirmative action provisions for certain under privileged classes of citizens, an
argument is made that the government’s policies of liberalization might result in undermining the scope
of these provisions.
58
In the context of provisions for affirmative action in the Indian Constitution, Singh argues that those
not merely enabling provisions and could be claimed by citizens against state like any other
fundamental right. M P Singh, Are Articles 15(4) and 16(4) Fundamental Rights? 3 SUPREME COURT
CASES (JOUR) 33 (1994).
59
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 3.
60
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (a)/(b) to para 3.
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or tacit involvement in the commission of above mentioned heinous crimes, since the
Second World War to the present day.61

The Norms also contain another provision directed at remedying the fallouts of
security arrangements made by TNCs on human rights.62 “Business security
arrangements shall be used only for preventive or defensive services”, and the force
applied by security personnel shall be proportional and only when “strictly
necessary.”63 It must also be kept in mind that security personnel do not violate
important rights of workers/employees such as the rights to freedom of association
and peaceful assembly and to engage in collective bargaining.64 Moreover, TNCs
shall establish policies to prohibit the hiring of private militias/paramilitary groups, or
working with units of state security forces known for human rights violations.65
Again, we can see clearly the influence of the human rights violating activities of
Enron and Unocal on the drafting of these provisions.66

61

See Ratner, supra note 23, at 477-78; Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1073-74; Beth Stephens, The
Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 4950 (2002); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 803-07 (2002). See also generally Ramasastry, supra note 9; EDWIN BLACK, IBM
AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST
POWERFUL CORPORATION (2001).
62
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 3.
63
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (b) to para 4.
64
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (c) to para 4.
65
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (d) to para 4.
66
The report of Human Rights Watch on Enron documents in detail how Enron/Dabhol Power
Corporation violated civil-political right with the help on Indian police. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE
ENRON CORPORATION: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (1999), available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/ (last visited March 10, 2003). It should further be noted that
one of the charges leveled against Unocal before the US courts is that it aided/abetted the Burmese
military force to carry out forced dislocation, forced labour, rape etc. See John Cheverie, United States
Court Finds Unocal may be Liable for Aiding and Abetting Human Rights Abuses in Burma, 10
HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 6 (2002).
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4. Rights of Workers
The UN Norms make elaborate provisions regarding workers’ rights. TNCs are
supposed to provide a safe and healthy working environment,67 and are mandated not
to use forced or compulsory labour as forbidden by the relevant international
instruments, national legislations, and international human rights/humanitarian law.68
A special provision obligates TNCs to respect the right of children to be protected
from economic exploitation.69 TNCs shall not only create and implement a plan to
eliminate child labour70 but also not employ any person under the age of 18 in any
type of work that is hazardous, interferes with child’s education, or is likely to
jeopardize the health, safety or moral of young persons.71

Besides the above rights, two more provisions deserve special mention. First, TNCs
shall provide workers with remuneration “that ensures an adequate standard of living
for them and their families.”72 The remuneration should be freely agreed upon or
fixed by national laws/regulation, whichever is higher,73 and keep in mind the

67

UN Norms, supra note 6, para 7. The relevant commentary further provides that TNCs “shall make
available information about the health and safety standards relevant to their local activities.”
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (b) to para 7. Such a provision is very
important because most of times corporations do not disclose information about the possible negative
effects of their activities on the health/safety of employees, consumers and general public. For
example, in Bhopal catastrophe the failure of UCC/UCIL to provide prompt and adequate information
about the negative effects of MIC and other gases proved fatal as far as victims are concerned.
68
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 5. It is also provided that employers shall have resort to prison labour
only as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the work/service is carried out
under the supervision and control of a public authority. Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28,
commentary (c) to para 5.
69
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 6. “Economic exploitation” is defined in an expansive manner to
include employment “in a manner that is harmful to their health or development” or in any occupation
“before a child completes compulsory schooling and, except for light work, before the child reaches 15
years of age.” Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (a) to para 4.
70
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (d) to para 6.
71
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (b) to para 6. TNC may, however, employ
persons aged 13 to 15 years in light work in national laws or regulations permit. Commentary on UN
Norms, supra note 28, commentary (c) to para 6. Such a provision though might be misused by TNCs
in view of the fact that they often enjoy more bargaining power than many developing countries.
72
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 8.
73
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (a) to para 8.
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principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value.74 Second, the TNCs shall
ensure freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining of their employees/workers,75 especially in those countries which do not
fully implement international standards concerning those rights.76 It should be noted
that a sincere commitment on the part of corporations to respect the rights to freedom
of association and collective bargaining could go a long way in protecting rest of the
workers’ rights.

It is clear from a brief review of workers’ rights that the Norms seek to achieve lofty
goals and make extensive provisions to attain those goals. Critics, however, argue that
the intended results might not be achieved as ambiguity in the provisions affords
enough room for corporations not to follow the provisions in spirit. For example, with
the reference to the provision for fair and reasonable remuneration77 it is argued that
the Norms “leave it open to anyone to interpret what are an adequate standard of
living and a just wage” and “continue to base their wage criteria on the notion of
national conditions.”78 Though the first point regarding ambiguity deserve
consideration, a suggestion for having equal global wages, both in North and South, is
more difficult to defend as well as pursue. Even if workers in North and South work
for same number of hours and under similar circumstances, it will be both unrealistic
and unreasonable to argue that they should be given same wages, for the wages
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Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (e) to para 8.
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 9. TNCs are also supposed to respect the right to workers to strike.
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (b) to para 9.
76
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (e) to para 9.
77
On reading para 8 with commentary (a), it seems that remuneration would be “fair and reasonable”
only if it ensures an adequate standard of living for workers and their families. UN Norms, supra note
6, para 8.
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See, for example, The JUS Semper Global Alliance – Living Wages North and South, Corporate
Social
Responsibility
and
Human
Rights
(September
2003),
2,
available
at
http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Corporate%20Activity/Resources/CSRandHRnorms.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 19, 2003).
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awarded to workers at any two given places would command different purchasing
power to satisfy basic needs. It is still necessary though to agree on common variables
with reference to which fair and reasonable wages could be determined at national
level. This is further explained below with reference to a distinction which should be
drawn between aspirational and operational standards of human rights.

5. Respect for National Sovereignty and Human Rights
Under the umbrella of “respect for national sovereignty and human rights”, the Norms
stipulate obligations on a wide range of issues – from adherence to rule of law to
abstaining from corruption, from promoting right to development to respect for
national laws/regulation, from promoting social, economic and cultural rights to
positive contribution for human rights realisation generally.79 The most striking
feature of these provisions is their treatment of TNCs, together with other state
organs, as vehicle of developing a society wedded to rule of law, transparency,
accountability and sustainable development and in which people’s civil, political,
economic, social and cultural right are realised. Despite the fact that TNCs obligations
are subject to the limitations of “their resources and capabilities”,80 it represents a
departure from the traditional role of TNCs in society in at least three respects. First,
the human rights obligations of TNCs instead of being limited to mere civil and
political rights now also encompass second and third generation human rights, that is,
both individual and collective social, economic and cultural rights. Second, the scope
of obligations is clearly broadened; TNCs shall be subject to both negative and
positive obligations. Third, TNCs are expected to respect/promote human rights not

79
80

UN Norms, supra note 6, paras 10-12.
See Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (a) to para 10.
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only of those who are affected by their activities directly (workers/consumers) but
also of those affected indirectly, invisibly and/or in the longer run (society as such).

It will be worthwhile to note some of the obligations which demonstrate the above
shift. TNCs are, for example, expected to enhance the transparency of their activities
in regard to payments made to government/public officials.81 They are also obligated
to respect the rights of indigenous people, including “to own, occupy, develop,
control, protect and use their lands, other natural resources, and other cultural and
intellectual property.”82 Moreover, TNCs shall contribute to the realisation, in
particular, of the rights to development; adequate food and drinking water; the highest
attainable standard of physical/mental health; adequate housing; privacy; education;
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and freedom of opinion and
expression.83

The above provisions undoubtedly reflect a paradigmatic shift in terms of the
appropriate role and place of corporations in society generally and regarding human
rights in particular.84 But the Norms merely paint this picture with a broad brush; it is
not clear how TNCs are expected to put these expectations into practice. Various
issues would require clarification or concretisation before TNCs actually deliver the
desired goods. For example, whether only those TNCs whose activities come in direct
contact or conflict with certain human rights are under a positive obligation, or all
operating TNCs are under a general obligation to promote all the human rights? It
seems that the Norms tend to adopt, in my view rightly, the second option, but in that
81

Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (a) to para 11.
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (c) to para 10.
83
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 12.
82
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case it will be necessary that corporate law, which governs the establishment and
working of corporations, both at national and international level is amended to
provide for taking into account the impact of corporate decisions/activities on human
rights in society. The Norms are, however, silent on this issue. Unless it is precisely
clear what we want TNCs to do, any further talks about the efficacy of the proposed
regime will be premature as well as unsound.

6. Obligations with Regard to Consumer Protection
As the activities of corporations also come in conflict with consumers’ various
(human) rights,85 the Norms make specific provision to address this issue. TNCs shall
not only act in accordance with fair business, marketing and advertising practices,
including relating to competition and anti-trust matters, but also take all necessary
steps to ensure safety/quality of the goods and services provided.86 An important
aspect is that TNCs are also expected to observe the precautionary principle,87 and
also disclose, in cases where a product is potentially harmful, all appropriate
information on the contents and possible hazardous effects of the products through
proper labelling, informative and accurate advertising and other appropriate
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See, for example, Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations have no
Incentive to Define Human Rights 11 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL TRADE 101 (2002).
85
Consumers’ rights to information, health and safety, and clean environment are directly affected by
corporate decisions/activities. For example, a study conducted by Chapman & Carter demonstrates how
Australian tobacco industry strived hard to avoid, delay and dilute health warnings on cigarettes. S
Chapman & S M Carter, “Avoid Health Warnings on All Tobacco Products for Just as Long as We
Can: A History of Australian Tobacco Industry Efforts to Avoid, Delay and Dilute Health Warnings on
Cigarettes, 12(Suppl III) TOBACCO CONTROL JOURNAL iii13-iii22 (2003). Also, a recent investigation
indicates that pharmaceutical companies are investing millions of dollars into patient advocacy groups
and medical organisations in order to expand markets for their products. Gary Hughes & Liz Minchin,
Drug Firms Fund Disease Awareness, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 13-14, 2003, 5; Gary Hughes
& Liz Minchin, Sugar-Coating the Message, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 13-14, 2003, 30.
86
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 13. See also Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary
(a) to (e) to para 13.
87
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 13. See also Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary
(c) to para 13. ‘Precautionary principle’ means that lack of full scientific certainty should not be used
as a justification for not taking or delaying a step which could have enhanced the safety/quality of the
goods or services, especially when doing so may result in irreversible harm.
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methods.88 These provisions will become immensely relevant in the time to come, for
example, in the context of genetically modified products, or breast implants
technology.

7. Obligations with Regard to Environmental Protection
The UN Norms also respond to the growing concern about corporations’ indifference
to sustainable development while taking business decisions as well as formulating
short/long term policies. Accordingly, TNCs shall carry out their activities in
accordance with laws, practices and policies of the country of operation as well as
international

agreements,

principles

and

standards

regarding environmental

perseverance in order to contribute to “the wider goal of sustainable development.”89
TNCs are required to assess periodically the impact of their activities on environment
and human health,90 especially of certain groups such as children, older person,
women and indigenous people.91 Further, best management practices and technologies
must be adopted to reduce the risk of accidents and damage to the environment.92

As TNCs operate in countries placed at different levels of development and
consequently having varying levels of environmental standards, it becomes
problematic and often full of business dilemmas as to which standards out of three –
home, host or international – should they follow. Though the Norms mandates TNCs
to observe both international and host standards, in many situations the host standards

88

Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (e) to para 13.
UN Norms, supra note 6, para 14.
90
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (c) to para 14.
91
Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28, commentary (d) to para 14. TNCs are also required to
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are as good as non-existent or are not enforced.93 As far as the international standards
are concerned, they are generally so vague and general that it is quite easy to comply
with their words without adhering to the spirit.94 In such a scenario, it is worth
exploring whether TNCs should not follow the higher of home or host standards,
irrespective of the fact where they operate.95

B. Operational Difficulties: A Response
Despite making a commendable effort to formulate human rights obligations for
TNCs, the UN Norms, in my view, might face several operational shortcomings. Two
of such possible difficulties are dealt with below.

1. (Over)-reference to International Human Rights Law/Instruments?
The Norms make frequent reference to numerous international treaties, which are
negotiated as well as signed by states and are directed primarily towards states. This
approach is problematic due to several reasons. At the outset, the approach is circular.
Instead of laying down ascertainable and guidable human rights standards, it leads the
consumers of the Norms – from TNCs to NGOs, states, and victims – to several
national and international instruments. In other words, the questions such as what are
the obligations of TNCs in a given case and whether they violated those obligations
cannot be determined with reference to the UN Norms. Though at places the
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For example, India had no “specific” law dealing with environmental pollution, hazardous
substances, or violations of human rights in 1984, at the time of the Bhopal accident. In fact, the
Bhopal catastrophe led to the enactment of the Environment Protection Act of 1986, the Public
Liability Insurance Act of 1991, and the National Environment Tribunal Act of 1995. Similarly,
Myanmar had no law specifically dealing with the environment, human rights, or forced labor in 1993
when Unocal entered into a joint venture project in Myanmar. Later, Myanmar passed the Protection of
Wild Life, Wild Plants and Conservation of Natural Areas Law of 1994.
94
It will be overoptimistic to assume that precise environmental obligations for TNCs are
ascertainable, for example, from the Stockholm Declaration (1972) or the Rio Declaration (1992).
95
See generally Deva, Dilemma between “Home” and “Rome”, supra note 27.
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appended commentary try to give concrete shape to some of the obligations,96 on the
whole that is highly inadequate. A reference to state oriented international instruments
to deduce TNCs’ human rights obligations might present another difficulty when it
comes to TNCs’ positive obligations.97 Whether the positive human rights obligations
of TNCs, especially regarding socio-economic and cultural rights, are expected to be
equivalent to that of states, which were conceived as original and primary targets of
such international instruments?98 If TNCs’ positive obligations are not as extensive as
that of states, which seems to be a more probable as well as acceptable stand,99 then it
will be logical to stipulate their obligations separately.

I argue, therefore, that though there is no need to redefine human rights especially for
corporations and it is perfectly legitimate to rely upon international instruments
‘negotiated-signed-applicable’ to states to construct human rights obligations for
TNCs,100 it may still be necessary to deduce specific obligations of TNCs with
reference to the referred international instruments. This is also required because TNCs
could not possibly violate certain human rights enumerated in state-focal international
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See, for example, commentary (a) to (c) to para 6 and commentary (f) to para 7. Commentary on UN
Norms, supra note 28.
97
See, for example, Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The “Fourth
Wave” of Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 425, 436-38 (2003)
(examining the complex question which arise regarding the human rights obligations of pharmaceutical
companies).
98
For example, a pharmaceutical company should have positive obligations only regarding those
human rights which are directly related to its core business (e.g., right to health), or qua all human
rights generally (e.g., right to adequate housing or food/drinking water).
99
For obvious reasons TNCs cannot be equated to states as far as the nature and extent of human rights
obligations are concerned. Donaldson argues that “corporation is an economic animal” and therefore,
“it would be unfair, not to mention unreasonable, to hold corporations to the same standards of charity
and love as human individuals.” THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 84
(1989). See also Deva, Dilemma between “Home” and “Rome”, supra note 27, at 95-96.
100
Raz argues that ‘there is no closed list of duties which correspond to the right …. A change of
circumstances may lead to the creation of new duties based on old right.’ JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 171 (1986) (Emphasis added).
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treaties.101 Therefore, in my view, subject to the limitation regarding putting
universality in operation discussed below, it is desirable that the human rights
obligations of TNCs are enumerated, as far as possible and in an inclusive manner, in
a schedule to the Norms. Doing so will not only bring certainty in terms of what is to
be followed and consequent higher rate of compliance, but will also be an
economically efficient way of regulation.

2. Human Rights Standards: Putting Universality in Operation?
The Norms acknowledge, among others, the universality of human rights,102 which in
the context of TNCs also mean that they should observe the same standards of human
rights whether operating in “home” or at “Rome”. Though this article is not the
appropriate place to join an already intensive and extensive debate over universality
(or lack of it) of human rights generally,103 I intend to explore this additional TNCsrelated dimension of universality which arise because of the fact that TNCs, unlike
states, operate in more than one country. Agreeing that TNCs shall pay fair and
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See, for example, Article 11 of the UDHR and Article 14(2) of the ICCPR [right to be presumed
innocent when charged for a penal offence]; Article 12 of the ICCPR [liberty to leave and enter his
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violation of even such rights. Ratner, supra note 23, at 492-3.
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reasonable remuneration, whether fair and reasonable would quantify into ‘same’
wages, say, at a factory in India and in the US? Again agreeing that TNCs shall
contribute to the realisation of, say, the right to drinking water (or access to highest
attainable standard of health, for that matter), what type of and level of contamination
will make the water not suitable for ‘drinking’ (or in case of right to health, by which
yardstick highest attainable standard will be judged)? Such examples, which could be
easily multiplied with reference to various provisions in the Norms, demonstrate that
there are operational difficulties associated with universal human rights. How such
difficulties could be overcome, to the satisfaction of the affected parties having
conflicting interests?

Even if we assume arguendo that human rights are universal, it seems that in case of
many human rights universality is only in terms of aspiration and not regarding the
content of aspiration; in fact, a push for pressing universality also regarding the
content of rights might result in negation rather than promotion of human rights. For
example, there is a universal right to food but it is doubtful whether there is a
universal right to a particular type of food. Similarly, the right to safe and healthy
working environment or the right to fair and reasonable subsistence wages is universal
only in abstract terms and in each case the quantification of what is safe and healthy
or fair and reasonable is bound to vary from place to place. Thus, in order to
operationalise the abstract universality and/or to ascertain the content of human rights,
certain adjustments to local social, political, economic and cultural conditions are to
be made.104 A distinction, therefore, need to be drawn between aspirational and
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For example, Wright argues how local cultural differences might be used to promote human rights,
and a failure to recognise such differences might in fact result in subverting human rights. SHELLEY
WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, DECOLONISATION AND GLOBALISATION: BECOMING
HUMAN 88-93, 111, 213-14 (2001).
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operational standards of human rights. A note of caution, however, is required in
localising the universality in such a manner. As the objective of this exercise is to
promote human rights, it should be ensured that only those local differences are given
weight which help in fulfilling the intended objective; the differences which do not
respect human dignity should be treated as irrelevant.105

In view of the above distinction proposed between aspirational and operational
standards of human rights, the Norms could only possibly lay down aspirational
standards of human rights. Such aspirational standards would require to be translated
into concrete measurable operational standards at municipal level. Unfortunately, the
Norms do not recognise this distinction and consequently try to achieve an impossible
balance between generality and specificity. In the absence of UN Norms not adopting
the distinction between aspirational and operational standards, they might prove
ineffective not only in guiding the conduct of TNCs but also working as touchstone
with reference to which violation of human rights could be measured. Recognition of
such a distinction, on the other hand, is likely to increase the efficacy of the UN
Norms.

IV.

IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS

Lack of implementation strategy and effective sanctions have been the most critical
lacunae of the existing international regimes of corporate responsibility for human
rights violations.106 Being conscious of this aspect, the UN Norms, after some initial
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debate during drafting stage,107 make a departure from the past approach of merely
voluntary implementation. Paragraphs 15 to 19 deal with “general provisions of
implementation”. Out of these, only first three paragraphs (15-17) relate to
implementation procedures stricto sensu; while paragraph 18 elaborates the obligation
to provide for reparation to the victims adversely affected by non-compliance with the
Norms, paragraph 19 lays down the rule that the Norms shall not be “construed as
diminishing, restricting, or adversely affecting the human rights obligations” of states
and/or TNCs under national or international laws.108 I begin below with an analysis of
the provisions related to multiple implementation techniques as well as reparation and
then move on to examine some of the lacunae which may seriously hamper the
efficacy of the prescribed implementation mechanism.

A. Techniques and Modes of Implementation
The UN Norms try to combine multiple implementation techniques for ensuring that
TNCs comply with their human rights obligations. On a closer scrutiny of the relevant
provisions, one can also notice that these techniques seek to implement two different
types of obligations: direct and indirect. Paragraphs 15 and 16 are aimed at
implementing direct obligations of TNCs and I will, therefore, call it the “direct
mode”. The mode is direct because it treats TNCs under a direct obligation to
respect/promote human rights and seeks to enforce such obligation by invoking

Merger]. See also William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and
Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 501, at 503-04 (2001); and the Letters from Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, to the Global Compact Office (Oct. 21, 2001, Nov. 2001, April 7, 2003)
available
at
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internal as well as external techniques. Paragraph 17, on the other hand, is directed at
implementing indirect obligations, i.e., the obligation of states to ensure that all
entities, including TNCs, within their jurisdiction respect human rights rather than
implementing TNCs’ obligations to respect human rights.109 This can, therefore, be
termed as “indirect mode” to distinguish it from the first one.110 I believe that the
distinction between the two modes is vital. To draw an analogy, it is the distinction
between saying that minor children shall not drive and that parents shall ensure that
their minor children do not drive. The distinction, in other words, is that in the former
case the proposed mechanism, whether national or international, will be enforcing
obligations imposed directly on TNCs whereas in the latter what the mechanism will
be enforcing is only an intermediary/indirect obligation, i.e., states’ obligation to
ensure that TNCs within their territory respect human rights.111

1. Direct Mode
The direct mode adopts a two-fold strategy of implementation. First, TNCs “shall
adopt, disseminate and implement internal rules of operation in compliance with the
Norms”.112 As here the emphasis is on TNCs adopting and applying the Norms
themselves, I will call this the strategy of “internalisation”. The strategy of
109
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29, 43-49 (2003) (discussing the emerging jurisprudence of indirect obligations).
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E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1
(2002),
available
at
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899.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
111
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human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including ensuring that transnational
corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights.” (Emphasis added). Supra note 6.
See also Chirwa, supra note 109; supra note 23.
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internalisation is directed towards developing a corporate culture of respect to human
rights. TNCs should give appropriate training to their managers and workers as an
initial step for building such a culture.113 More importantly, such human rights culture
is not to be confined to the narrow legal structure of TNCs but has to extend to their
contractors-suppliers et al, as TNCs are obligated to apply and incorporate the Norms
in the relevant contracts/business arrangements.114 TNCs shall either ensure that their
business partners comply with human rights obligations or cease to work with
them.115 Though TNCs might contend that this is an impractical expectation, the
Norms rightly place the obligation directly and squarely on TNCs because only TNCs
are in a position/power to achieve this result.

Second, TNCs “shall be subject to periodic monitoring and verifying by United
Nations, other international and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be
created.”116 It can be termed “external” strategy in view of the focus being on external
agencies keeping an eye on the conduct of TNCs. Though the Norms have not
elaborated upon the details of proposed monitoring/verification, the appended
commentary suggests that the UN human rights treaty bodies should monitor
implementation of these Norms, among others, through the “creation of additional
reporting requirements for states.”117 A role is also envisaged for other UN special
agencies, including the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on
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the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.118 But it is surprising that there is no
specific mention of the Global Compact despite the fact that it is a UN initiative
especially directed towards corporate social responsibility. Moreover, the reliance on
state reporting to ensure that TNCs comply with the Norms is too optimistic to be
realistic, 119 more so when states act in connivance with TNCs on many occasions.120

It can be said that though the Norms rightly take cognizance of the necessity of
putting in place an external international regulatory regime to make TNCs
accountable for human rights violations, they fall short of moving in the right
direction. For example, it requires thorough investigation whether a new international
body is created for this purpose121 or the existing institutions, including the WTO, are
moulded to enforce human rights obligations against TNCs.122 What is, however,
appreciable that the commentary to paragraph 16 not only encourages trade unions
and NGOs to invoke the Norms for their actions/dealings with TNCs, but also hope
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that the Norms could be used as benchmarks of ethical investing.123 Such a provision
is important because the success of any mechanism aimed at enforcing human rights
obligations on TNCs requires, in addition to traditional enforcement tools, evolution
and employment of new enforcement strategies.

2. Indirect Mode
Under the indirect mode, the Norms expects that “states should establish and reinforce
the necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring that the Norms” are
implemented by the TNCs.124 It is interesting to note that this is the only provision
that is drafted in terms of ‘should’, a deviation which is difficult to explain especially
when the obligation of states to respect and promote human rights also includes the
responsibility to ensure/secure respect from other natural or legal persons operating
within its territory.125 The appended commentary elaborates further the above
expectation of the UN Norms: the governments should not only make these Norms
widely known but also use them as a model for initiating legislations or taking
administrative processes, including national human rights commissions.126 Whether
this provision makes any difference or not, will depend to a large extent on how the
courts, both municipal and international, make use of this directory mandate.127
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B. Provision for Reparation
In case TNCs fail to comply with the Norms, they shall provide reparation to
individuals, entities and communities adversely affected by such failure.128 The
reparation, which may take the form of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation
for any damage done or property taken, must be prompt, effective and adequate.129
This provision is significant because of at least three reasons. First, it implies that
victims of corporate human rights abuses shall have a right to claim compensation.
Thus, TNCs should no longer be able to present payment of monetary compensation
as a sign of mercy shown to the victims.130 Second, as the compensation could be
claimed even by communities, presumably for violation of collective rights, this will
take care of those situations when it is difficult to attribute harm to identifiable
individuals. Third, the provision expressly acknowledges that reparation, in order to
serve any real purpose, should be prompt, effective and adequate.

Despite the above positives, one difficult issue survives regarding the adequacy of
compensation. Courts, both at municipal and international levels, face an obvious
difficulty in quantifying damages for human rights violations, especially when victims
and TNCs belong to countries placed in vastly different stages of economic
development. It seems that the guidance offered by the Norms – that courts, while
determining damages, shall apply the Norms in pursuance to national/international
law131 – does not reach to the root of the problem. The quantification of damages
invariably raises the question about the value of life, say, of a worker in an Indian
128
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factory qua a worker employed in a similar factory in the US or Europe. To put it
differently, whether the loss of life should have same monetary value everywhere or
not? Another ambiguity remains regarding the objectives sought to be achieved by the
provision for reparation; it is not clear whether deterrence is one of the underlying
themes. If deterrence is one of objectives behind reparation, which in my view should
be, then there should be a specific provision for awarding punitive damages. If so,
what should be the test for determining punitive damages; whether the proportionality
of the harm caused or the economic capacity of the concerned TNC should play any
role in this regard?132

C. What is still Lacking?
Effective and efficient implementation of the Norms holds the key to the extent of
their success in achieving the intended objective. Though the Norms make a sincere
attempt in formulating the provisions for implementation, in my view they fall short
of what is required. In my view, the UN Norms suffer from at least following three
glaring omissions which might seriously hamper the prospect of their viable
enforcement.

1. Multiple Sanctions
As explained above, the Norms stipulate implementation provisions. But which
coercive measures could follow if certain TNCs fail to implement the mandate of the
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Norms? It seems that the response of the Norms to such a situation is two-fold. First,
the expectation is that states will establish the necessary legal framework to ensure
that TNCs comply with their human rights standards under the Norms and also
otherwise.133 It is logical to assume that provisions related to sanctions could be part
of such legal framework. It can, however, be said that administering sanctions solely
or even predominantly through states might not fulfill the desired results. Past
experiences show that on many occasions, if not always, states either act in complicity
with TNCs134 or tacitly align with them.135 This is besides the fact that any municipal
system will always find it difficult to impose sanctions on a transnational entity.136

Second, TNCs which fail to implement the Norms are obligated to pay reparation to
those adversely affected.137 Reparation is undoubtedly an important, and from the
perspective of victims also useful, remedy, but it is doubtful whether reparation alone
could coerce TNCs to respect the Norms. Ideally, the UN Norms should employ three
types of sanctions against TNCs: civil, criminal and social. Reparation under the
Norms seems to be used only as a civil remedy as it is unclear whether it is also
intended to be utilised as a criminal sanction. It is important that the Norms not only
resort to criminal sanctions against TNCs (and their human hands) but also effectively
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invoke social sanctions – by which I mean outcast of the concerned corporation from
the market through blacklisting/ban on commercial dealings, and also pressure
emanating from consumers, investors, media and NGOs138 – to enforce the human
rights obligations against TNCs.139 Further, it is equally vital that these multiple
sanctions flow, wherever possible, from international as well as non-state sources,
including market forces.

2. Enforcement Mechanism
A strong enforcement mechanism is sine qua non for effective implementation of the
Norms. Being alive to this, the Norms conceive of multiple monitoring and
verification mechanisms, both at national and international levels.140 But it seems that
the idea is still undeveloped; no definite and/or viable framework for such a
mechanism is ascertainable from the Norms, and the appended commentary invite the
Sub-Commission on Human Rights and other UN bodies “to develop additional
techniques for implementing and monitoring these Norms.”141 If the Norms are
adopted in its present form, that is, without any concrete mechanism to supervise the
implementation, it will undoubtedly make a mockery of the Norms, framed
admittedly in “non-voluntary” terms and supported for the first time with
implementation provisions. Therefore, an enforcement mechanism should be put in
place before the Norms being adopted. It is equally critical that the mechanism is both
effective and efficient, that is, it could not only preempt human rights violations but
also offer speedily an adequate remedy to the victims in cases of violation. For
138
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example, the suggestion of monitoring implementation by existing human rights
treaty bodies through additional state reporting requirement142 is likely to prove
neither effective nor efficient.143

3. Response to (Mis)use of Procedural Issues
At least two procedural issues – forum non conveniens144 and the liability of a parent
corporation for human rights violations by its subsidiaries145 – have often been
(mis)used by TNCs to avoid or delay their responsibility for human rights
violations.146 The judicial response to these two issues has also, by and large, helped
the cause of TNCs rather than the victims.147 But the UN Norms do not address these
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important procedural issues, in the absence of which any implementation mechanism,
even if equipped with multiple sanctions, can hardly deliver justice to the victims.

The Norms should, therefore, respond to the above procedural challenges by offering
principled148 guidelines to be followed by courts. For example, on the issue of the
liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations by its subsidiaries, the
Norms could adopt the enterprise theory rather than the entity theory as the basis of
liability.149 This will ensure that the courts instead of deciding the issue afresh in each
and every case, which is not only time consuming but also leads to inconsistent
decisions, may determine the question of liability swiftly and in accordance with a
predictable principle rather than wagering between various principles.150 This will
also send a signal to those parent corporations which conduct more hazardous
business through financially weaker subsidiaries151 and then keep distance by design
with them in order to exploit a principle of corporate law which is probably out of
tune with the present day reality of TNCs.152
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Similarly, the existing predominant judicial approach to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens also require adjustment, at least when cases are tried by municipal courts,
so as to prevent its abuse for evading liability for human rights violations. The Norms
should take a lead in this regard. Blumberg suggests that presence of international
human rights should be considered among the public interest factors to be taken into
consideration by courts while hearing the plea of forum non conveniens.153 It can
further be argued that since realisation of human rights is no longer a matter internal
to national boundaries, in cases involving human rights violations the doctrine of
forum non conveniens should be invoked only when courts are of the view that a
particular forum is clearly and grossly inconvenient to the defendant.154

V.

CONCLUSION

Many actors – from states155 to international institutions,156 academia, media and civil
society organs157 – are engaged in a search for evolving an effective as well as
efficient regulatory framework of TNCs’ accountability for human rights violations.
The UN initiatives hold a prominent, if not central, place in such a quest; the Norms
being the most recent, and also to date most promising, effort on the part of the UN.
153
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The Norms seems to have benefited from the exposure of the infirmities of its
predecessor as well as other current regulatory regimes of corporate human rights
responsibility, as they apparently seek to remedy some of those infirmities. However,
certain lacunae still survive which, in my view, might hamper the efficacy of the
Norms and neutralise the edge which they claim over their counterparts.

I have argued in this article that though the Norms revive the hope for establishing a
legally binding international regime of corporate responsibility for human rights
violations, they represent an imperfect step, albeit in the right direction. It is critical
for the efficacy of the Norms that imperfections related to both formulation and
implementation of TNCs’ human rights obligations are further deliberated upon
thoroughly before any move towards the adoption of the Norms. In sum, it is argued
that the Norms should not only deduce human rights obligations of TNCs from statefocal international treaties and maintain a distinction between aspirational and
operational standards of human rights, but also establish a robust enforcement
mechanism which invokes multiple sanctions. Besides, the Norms should also take
the lead in responding to hindrances posed by the procedural issues related to forum
non conveniens and the liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations by
its subsidiaries.

Though at this stage it is difficult to predict with certainty whether the UN
Commission on Human Rights will adopt the Norms in March 2004, or whether they
will become legally binding stricto sensu in the near future, in my view it might be
more appropriate that some of the issues raised herein are deliberated upon further
RIGHTS: A CHALLENGE FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL WORLD 58-70 (2002), available
at http://www.paxchristi.net/PDF/DEC06E02.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
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before a formal adoption of the Norms. As far as the binding nature of the Norms is
concerned, it will be ideal if they take the shape of a legally binding instrument; but
this is not to suggest that the non-binding Norms could not contribute, in some way,
to rectify the current state of TNCs’ impunity for human rights violations. What is
more important, however, that a healthy debate amongst all the affected parties on an
issue of vital significance ensues, and if that happens, the present article would
achieve its modest objective of highlighting the positives and exposing some of the
inadequacies of the Norms.
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